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Abstract
In response to financial turmoil that began in 2007 and the effective lower bound for
short-term interest rates that was reached in late-2008, the Federal Reserve adopted a raft
of ‘unconventional’ monetary policies, notably: forward guidance and large-scale asset pur-
chases. These policies transmit to the real economy, inter alia, via an interest rate channel,
with two sub-channels: signalling and portfolio rebalancing. I apply the OIS-augmented
decomposition of interest rates from Lloyd (2017a) to identify these two sub-channels. I
demonstrate that US unconventional monetary policy announcements between November
2008 and April 2013 did exert significant signalling and portfolio balance effects on financial
markets, reducing longer-term interest rates. Signalling effects were particularly powerful at
horizons in excess of two years. As a result of these declines, unconventional monetary policy
aided real economic outcomes. I show that the signalling channel exerted a more powerful
influence on US industrial production and consumer prices than portfolio rebalancing. In
terms of long-term bond yield and industrial production effects, the signalling channel is
associated with around two-thirds to three-quarters of the total effects attributed to the two
channels.
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1 Introduction
Before the recent crisis, monetary policy was primarily conducted with one instrument: a
short-term nominal interest rate. In the wake of financial turmoil and the subsequent reduction
of short-term interest rates to their effective lower bound (ELB), central banks increasingly
turned to ‘unconventional’ monetary policy tools, defined here as instruments beyond the ‘tra-
ditional’ policy rate. In this paper, I focus on US unconventional monetary policies announced
since November 2008:1 large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) and forward guidance. These two
policies can transmit to the real economy, inter alia, via an interest rate channel with two sub-
components: signalling and portfolio rebalancing. I assess the relative importance of these two
channels for US unconventional policy in terms of their effect on the real economy — the ulti-
mate goal of the policies. I show that unconventional monetary policies have placed significant
downward pressure on long-term interest rates via both the signalling and portfolio balance
channels. The primary finding is that reductions in long-term interest rates during the period
of unconventional monetary policy easing between November 2008 and April 2013 have exerted
a more powerful influence on the real economy through the signalling channel than through
portfolio rebalancing. In terms of long-term bond yield and industrial production effects, the
signalling channel is associated with around two-thirds to three-quarters of the total effects
attributed to the two channels.
Federal Reserve (Fed) LSAPs have involved the direct purchase of longer-term assets from
secondary markets. Since December 2008, the Fed has purchased a range of longer-term US
Treasuries, agency debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), expanding its balance sheet by
over 600%.2 The policy was initiated “to put downward pressure on yields of a wide range of
longer-term securities, support mortgage markets and promote a stronger economic recovery”.3
The Fed announced the purchase of MBS and agency-backed bonds from private markets on
November 25, 2008. On March 18, 2009 this was extended to include the purchase of $300
billion of longer-term Treasury securities over a six-month period. These combined purchases
were dubbed ‘QE1’ and concluded on March 16, 2010, with the Fed holding $1.25 trillion of MBS
and $175 billion of agency-backed debt. The value of the asset stock was held constant until
the inception of ‘QE2’ on November 3, 2010, following strong suggestions of further purchases
in Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s August speech at Jackson Hole4 and his October speech at
the Boston Fed.5 From the outset of QE2, the Fed stated that it would purchase $600 billion of
longer-term US Treasuries over a six-month period, concluding in June 2011. ‘QE3’ marked the
1US large-scale asset purchases were first announced on November 25, 2008, just before the Federal Funds
rate was lowered to its ELB on December 16, 2008.
2A similar policy was adopted by the Bank of England in March 2009, stimulating a large body of research in
itself. The BoE has predominantly purchased longer-term UK gilts. The focus of this paper, and the references
within, is on US policy.
3www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-are-the-federal-reserves-large-scale-asset-purchases.htm.
4www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100827a.htm.
5www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20101015a.htm.
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most recent expansion of US LSAPs, announced on September 13, 2012.6 The Fed committed
to buying $40 billion of MBS and $45 billion of longer-term US Treasuries per month for an
indefinite period. After false expectations of a tapering in the amount of monthly purchases
under QE3 in May 2013, the Fed announced seven consecutive reductions in the rate of asset
purchases of $10 billion per month between December 18, 2013 and September 17, 2014. When
LSAPs were concluded in October 2014, the Fed held $4.5 trillion of securities outright.7
The Fed have adopted numerous forms of forward guidance since December 2008 (Ger-
aats, 2014). Initial guidance was qualitative, informing agents that the policy rate would be
maintained “for some time” (December 2008) or “for an extended period” (March 2009). Sub-
sequently, quantitative forward guidance was provided, including calendar-based guidance (Au-
gust 2011) — informing agents that economic conditions were “likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels for the federal funds rate” at least until a specified date — and threshold-based guid-
ance (December 2012) — stating that the “exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate
will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5 percent”.8
Moreover, the Fed engaged in forward guidance with respect to QE3, determining the size, pace
and composition of future purchases in relation to future economic conditions.
Understanding the relative importance of different transmission channels of unconventional
monetary policy is important because it can inform current and future policy. This study is
motivated by the differing policy implications of the signalling and portfolio balance channels.
Unconventional monetary policy can have signalling effects by influencing agents’ expectations
of the future policy rate path. Forward guidance can do this directly, though LSAPs can have
signalling benefits if they are perceived to signal a lower policy rate path for longer, especially
when announced in advance of actual purchases. A policy that works through the signalling
channel is likely to be most effective when it is clearly communicated, such that private sector
expectations react to it. Portfolio rebalancing can occur as a result of LSAPs. By purchasing
a longer-term asset from secondary markets, the central bank reduces the supply available to
investors, bidding up the price and reducing the yield of the asset. With lower returns on their
remaining holdings of the asset, investors can rebalance their portfolio to seek higher returns,
demanding other assets. This readjustment will increase the prices and reduce the yields of
other assets. The efficacy of the portfolio balance channel relies on the ‘large-scale’ of LSAPs
to generate sufficient portfolio adjustment to reduce long-term rates. Moreover, its benefits are
likely to be greatest when markets are not functioning normally (Vayanos and Vila, 2009).
Two key predictions of the interest rate channel have been tested thoroughly: (i) that LSAPs
and forward guidance reduced longer-term interest rates on announcement dates; and (ii) that
they had expansionary effects on output and inflation. Many authors have shown that LSAPs
6Between QE2 and QE3, the Fed also initiated a maturity extension program (MEP), which was announced
in September 2011 and was concluded in late 2012. The MEP was designed to extend the average maturity of the
Treasuries in the Fed’s portfolio, placing downward pressure on longer-term interest rates to support economic
conditions. The Fed sold a total of $667 billion shorter-term Treasury securities under the MEP, buying longer-
term Treasuries with the proceeds.
7Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances.
8These quotes are available here: www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/all/XXXXall.htm, where
XXXX denotes the year.
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did reduce longer-term interest rates (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Gagnon,
Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Wright, 2012; Bauer and
Rudebusch, 2014) on a range of assets, not only those purchased (D’Amico and King, 2012;
Rogers, Scotti, and Wright, 2014).9 Studies have shown that LSAPs averted deflation and
provided an expansionary impulse for output (e.g. Baumeister and Benati, 2013; Gambacorta,
Hofmann, and Peersman, 2012),10 though only IMF (2013) and Lloyd (2013) have explicitly
considered the importance of the signalling and portfolio balance channels for the real economy.
The majority of existing work has assessed the relative importance of the channels against
their financial market effects. Using decompositions of long-term interest rates, authors have
linked the portfolio balance channel to the term premium and the signalling channel to estimated
risk-neutral yields. Disagreement in the results from this literature originates from the different
yield curve decompositions used. Gagnon et al. (2011) use the survey-augmented affine Gaussian
arbitrage-free dynamic term structure model (GADTSM) decomposition of US Treasury yields
by Kim and Wright (2005) to show that, in terms of the yield effect, the portfolio balance channel
has dominated the signalling benefits of US LSAPs at the 10-year horizon. However, Christensen
and Rudebusch (2012) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2014), using alternative decompositions of
US Treasury yields, have found the opposite result.
In this paper, I focus on the relative importance of the two channels in terms of their effects
on the real economy, the ultimate goal of US policy. Using a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) methodology, Lloyd (2013) concludes that the signalling channel was relatively more
effective than the portfolio balance channel for US real GDP growth using the Kim and Wright
(2005) decomposition of the 10-year Treasury yield. This paper’s findings extend and rein-
force those in Lloyd (2013). To reach this conclusion, I offer novel solutions to two challenges
in existing literature: (i) the yield curve decomposition associated with signalling and port-
folio rebalancing; and (ii) the identification of signalling and portfolio balance shocks to the
macroeconomy.
In response to the first challenge, I compare three decompositions of the nominal US Trea-
sury yield curve into risk-neutral yields and term premia:11 (i) a bias-corrected model (Bauer,
Rudebusch, and Wu, 2012), used to assess LSAPs by Bauer and Rudebusch (2014); (ii) a survey-
augmented model (Kim and Wright, 2005), used to assess LSAPs by Gagnon et al. (2011); and
(iii) an overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate-augmented decomposition proposed in Lloyd (2017a).
As is widely recognised in the literature, GADTSMs suffer from an identification problem that
results in estimates of interest rate expectations that are spuriously stable (e.g. Bauer et al.,
2012; Kim and Orphanides, 2012; Guimara˜es, 2014). In this paper, I provide complementary
evidence to Lloyd (2017a) and show that, in comparison to financial market-based and survey
expectations of future short-term interest rates, the interest rate expectation estimates from
9Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong (2011) reach similar conclusions for the UK.
10Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoridis (2012) provide similar results for the UK.
11In GADTSMs, the risk-neutral yield corresponds to the average expected future short-term interest rate path,
plus a convexity (Jensen’s inequality) term. This convexity term is, in practice, small, and so the terms ‘risk-
neutral yield’ and ‘average expected future short-term interest rate’ are used interchangeably in the literature
and this paper.
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OIS-augmented models are superior to estimates from the bias-corrected and survey-augmented
GADTSMs. Moreover, I document that, despite efforts to improve identification, the survey-
augmented Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition does not fully overcome the identification
problem and attributes too much variation in interest rates to term premia. Thus, the financial
market event study estimates with the Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition represent a lower
bound for the relative efficacy of the signalling channel.
Using these yield curve decompositions, I carry out an event study of the financial market ef-
fects of signalling and portfolio rebalancing. This is the first paper to apply the OIS-augmented
GADTSM to the analysis of macroeconomic policy at the ELB. I find that LSAP and forward
guidance announcements had sizeable effects on interest rates and their associated expectations
and term premia components. At the 2, 5 and 10-year horizons, the OIS-augmented model at-
tributes 74.19-95.29% of the decline in yields on announcement days to signalling. Interestingly,
interest rate expectations were affected well beyond the 2-year horizon traditionally associated
with monetary policy’s transmission lags. The results from the OIS-augmented decomposition
differ starkly from the corresponding results using the survey-augmented Kim and Wright (2005)
decomposition, which attributes only 22.85-30.41% of event-day yield declines to signalling at
the 2, 5 and 10-year horizons.
To tackle the second challenge and estimate the relative effects of signalling and portfolio
rebalancing on real economic outcomes, I set up an SVAR. The baseline VAR includes four
monthly variables: industrial production, the consumer price index, and the risk-neutral yield
and term premium components of longer-term interest rates derived from each of the three yield
curve decompositions in turn. I identify structural shocks using combinations of zero-impact
and sign restrictions, with signalling shocks propagating through the risk-neutral yield and
portfolio rebalancing shocks through the term premium. To separately identify the signalling
and portfolio balance shocks, I assess the robustness of results to two restriction schemes. In
the first scheme, I impose that portfolio balance shocks cannot contemporaneously affect the
risk-neutral component of long-term rates — this captures a ‘pure term premium’ shock. In the
second, I impose the opposite: signalling shocks cannot immediately effect the term premium
— this captures a ‘pure expectations’ shock.
Under both restriction schemes I find that an expansionary signalling shock has significantly
positive lagged effects on US industrial production and consumer prices. In contrast, an expan-
sionary portfolio rebalancing shock has insignificant effects on these two variables, indicating
that signalling exerted a more powerful effect on US industrial production and consumer prices
than portfolio rebalancing. The signalling shock explains around two-thirds to three-quarters
of the total peak industrial production increase due to the long-term interest rate shocks. The
results are robust to: (i) the inclusion of bank credit and the real exchange rate as controls; (ii)
the interest rate maturity considered — even with longer-maturity yields, which place greater
weight on portfolio rebalancing in the event study, the signalling channel is shown to be rela-
tively more important for real outcomes; (iii) the sample length; and (iv) the term structure
decomposition used — the result even holds in SVAR specifications using the Kim and Wright
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(2005) yield curve decomposition, which places the lowest weight on signalling in the event study.
The results are also robust to using the 2-year OIS rate, instead of the 2-year risk-neutral yield,
alongside the 2-year term premium in the VAR to account for the possibility that, because
both the risk-neutral yield and the term premium are estimated within the same GADSTM,
they do not vary independently. My results suggest that current and future unconventional
monetary policy action by the Fed may reap greater economic rewards if combined with clear
communication about the future short-term interest rate path.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The transmission channels of unconven-
tional monetary policy are defined in section 2. Section 3 presents the yield curve decompositions
used in the event study (section 4) and SVARs (section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2 Transmission Channels
Unconventional monetary policy can affect the economy via numerous channels. The interest
rate channel is the primary focus of this analysis. By purchasing assets directly from secondary
markets, central bank LSAPs can raise asset prices and reduce a range of interest rates that
investors face. This can positively impact upon the real economy through, inter alia, reduced
borrowing costs and positive wealth effects.
A sizeable literature has amassed discussing a number of interest rate mechanisms through
which LSAPs affect the real economy (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). The focus
of my study, in line with work by Gagnon et al. (2011), Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) and others,
is on two components of the interest rate channel: signalling and portfolio rebalancing.
Primarily, I consider these channels because of their link to the canonical decomposition of
the long-term interest rate into a risk-neutral expected future short-term interest rate and term
premium12 component:
y
(L)
t =
1
L
Et
L−1∑
j=0
i
(1)
t+j + tp
(L)
t (1)
where y
(L)
t is the L-period government bond yield at time t, i
(1)
t is the one-period (net) interest
rate and tp
(L)
t is the L-period term premium. In line with the existing literature, I link signalling
to the risk-neutral component and portfolio rebalancing to the term premium.
Additionally, the signalling and portfolio balance channels are of direct relevance to policy.
They make up the language of policymakers. Bernanke (2010) emphasised the importance of
the portfolio balance channel as a means through which LSAPs can affect the economy:
“I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases work
primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel...”
Moreover, the policy implications relevant to each of the two channels differ: the signalling
channel implies that policymakers should clearly communicate the future path of short-term
12Where the term premium is defined broadly to encompass compensation for interest rate risk, inflation risk,
liquidity premia, counterparty risk, etc..
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interest rates; the portfolio balance channel relies on the stock of assets purchased being sufficient
enough in scale to influence term premia.
2.1 Signalling
The signalling channel refers to any effect that (unconventional) monetary policy announcements
have on investors’ expectations of future short-term policy rates. Such expectations can be
influenced by future macroeconomic outcomes or the expected conduct of monetary policy. If,
following forward guidance or LSAP announcements, investors anticipate the central bank to
keep interest rates lower for longer, then the announcement will influence long-term interest
rates by reducing expected future short-term interest rates. Although this definition subsumes
signals about future policy rates from forward guidance or LSAPs, it excludes any LSAP policy
anticipation or announcement effects that cause immediate portfolio changes. These will be
attributed to the term premium. In addition, although the main purpose of forward guidance is
to influence expectations of future policy rates, this could also reduce uncertainty about future
interest rates and thereby term premia (Akkaya, 2014).
In 2008, when the Fed initiated LSAPs, many critiques of the policy cited irrelevance and
neutrality propositions (e.g. Wallace, 1981). Integral to all of these results are assumptions re-
garding: timing; household homogeneity; perfect asset substitutability; non-distortionary taxa-
tion; and the link between government and central bank balance sheets. The logic behind these
results is as follows. The purchase of long-term assets by the central bank can increase house-
holds’ pre-tax state-contingent income. However, the purchase of the asset does not remove risk
from the aggregate economy. LSAPs will reduce the returns earned by the central bank portfolio,
necessitating an increase in lump-sum taxation by a non-distortionary government to balance
the joint government and central bank budget constraint. The after-tax state-contingent in-
come of homogeneous households will be unchanged, rendering LSAPs neutral for the economy.
Within these models, LSAPs can only circumvent neutrality propositions through signalling;
portfolio rebalancing is ineffective. In Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), only when LSAPs are
perceived to engender a commitment to keep interest rates lower for longer can they stimulate
the real economy. Bhattarai, Eggertsson, and Gafarov (2015) show that, following the purchase
of longer-term assets and a shortening of the duration of privately held outstanding government
debt, it is optimal for the central bank to keep short-term interest rates lower for longer to avoid
capital losses on their balance sheet. Therefore, at the ELB, LSAPs can optimally stimulate
the real economy by lowering the expected future path of real short-term interest rates.
2.2 Portfolio Rebalancing
The portfolio balance channel is linked to movements in term premia. By purchasing longer-
term assets from the private sector, LSAPs concurrently increase the private sectors’ holdings of
short-term reserves. For investors who view different asset classes and maturities as imperfect
substitutes to willingly accept this change, the price of longer-term assets must rise and their
yield fall. To the extent that this change occurs independently of the short-term interest rate,
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it works through the term premium on longer-term assets. With lower long-term asset returns,
investors will rebalance their portfolios, searching for higher yields by demanding other longer-
term assets. This demand-driven rebalancing will inflate prices and reduce term premia on
a range of long-term assets. D’Amico and King (2012) show that, although the term premia
reduction was largest for the assets purchased by the Fed, US LSAPs did engineer declines in
the term premia on a range of other longer-term assets. Ultimately, the lower term premia and
higher asset prices that result from portfolio rebalancing can transmit to the real economy by
reducing borrowing costs for the private sector and generating positive wealth effects for private
asset holders. The strength of portfolio rebalancing depends on the stock of assets purchased.
Because the term premium is defined to include compensation for interest rate risk, forward
guidance may also affect term premia. If, following central bank announcements, investors’
uncertainty surrounding the future path of short-term interest rates falls, this will be reflected
in lower term premia.13 Similarly, forward guidance about LSAPs can be expected to influence
term premia by instigating portfolio changes on announcement days.
Irrelevance propositions preclude portfolio rebalancing’s efficacy in many macroeconomic
models. To admit such effects, theorists have incorporated imperfect asset substitutability
(Tobin, 1956, 1969) with agent heterogeneity. Harrison (2011, 2012) and Chen, Cu´rdia, and
Ferrero (2012) show that LSAPs can benefit the real economy via portfolio rebalancing within
theoretical models.
2.3 Other Channels
Unconventional policy can transmit to the real economy through other channels. Joyce, Miles,
Scott, and Vayanos (2012) discuss a credit channel through which LSAPs can affect output and
inflation, independent of long-term interest rates. By purchasing assets from non-bank financial
institutions, the deposits these institutions place in banks may rise. If deposits exceed banks’
demand for liquidity, banks may be more willing to extend credit in the form of lending or less
willing to contract it if they suffer funding losses from other sources. This channel is likely to be
most effective when bank funding is disfunctional, as it was after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
It is likely to be relevant for US LSAPs, where the Fed has purchased the majority of its assets
from households (including hedge funds), broker dealers and insurance companies (Carpenter,
Demiralp, Ihrig, and Klee, 2013).
Unconventional monetary policy may also have international effects, through an exchange
rate channel. If forward guidance or LSAP announcements reduce contemporaneous interest
rates and expected future rates, they may lead international investors to seek higher returns
away from the domestic economy. Theoretically, this should depreciate the domestic currency,
ceteris paribus, aiding the price competitiveness of exports and, thus, domestic output. Bauer
and Neely (2012) argue that since these changes work through long-term interest rates, these
international effects are due to signalling and portfolio rebalancing. As a result, I assess the
13The term premium may also include liquidity premia. In my study, any liquidity effects due to unconventional
monetary policy are attributed to portfolio rebalancing.
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relative importance of signalling and portfolio rebalancing both with and without controls for
the international transmission of policy in section 5.
3 Decompositions of the Yield Curve
To assess the relative importance of the signalling and portfolio rebalancing channels, I rely
on decompositions of the yield curve, informed by (1), into risk-neutral yields (expectations of
future short-term interest rates) and term premia. Like other authors (e.g. Gagnon et al., 2011;
Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014), I associate the signalling channel with the risk-neutral yields
and portfolio rebalancing with the term premium. To decompose yields, I estimate three no-
arbitrage Gaussian affine dynamic term structure models (GADTSMs) and compare the results
across different models. The differing conclusions in the existing literature are driven by the
different GADTSMs used. For instance, Gagnon et al. (2011) use the survey-augmented Kim
and Wright (2005) GADTSM and conclude that the effects of portfolio rebalancing dominate
those of signalling, while Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) use the bias-corrected Bauer et al. (2012)
GADTSM and attribute a larger proportion of influence to signalling.
The differing predictions of GADTSMs in analyses of signalling and portfolio rebalancing
arise from an identification problem that results in estimates of interest rate expectations that
are spuriously stable (e.g. Kim and Orphanides, 2012; Guimara˜es, 2014). Central to the iden-
tification problem is an informational insufficiency. Unaugmented GADTSMs use bond yield
data as their sole input to inform the estimation of two quantities: fitted yields and risk-neutral
yields.14 As a symptom of the identification problem, a ‘finite-sample’ bias will arise where
there is insufficient information and a limited number of interest rate cycles in the observed
yield data.15 Finite-sample bias will result in estimates of expected future short-term interest
rate that are spuriously stable and, because bond yields are highly persistent, the bias can be
severe. Moreover, the severity of the bias is increasing in the persistence of the yield data. For
daily frequency yields, which are necessary for an event study and display greater persistence
than lower-frequency data, the bias is particularly pertinent.
In response to this, three solutions have been proposed: bias correction (Bauer et al., 2012);
survey-augmentation (Kim and Orphanides, 2012);16 and OIS-augmentation (Lloyd, 2017a).
The bias-corrected model is directly focused on resolving the finite-sample bias in GADTSMs.
Bauer et al. (2012) document that their bias-corrected estimates of future interest rate expec-
tations “are more plausible from a macro-finance perspective” (p. 454) than those from unaug-
mented GADTSMs. However, the bias correction does not directly tackle the informational
insufficiency at the heart of the problem. Actual bond yields remain the only estimation input.
Wright (2014) argues that bias-corrected estimates of future interest rate expectations are “far
too volatile” (p. 339).
14The term premium is the risk-neutral yield minus the corresponding-maturity fitted yield.
15Kim and Orphanides (2012, p. 242) state that a sample spanning 5-15 years may contain too few interest
rate cycles.
16The Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition is estimated using the Kim and Orphanides (2012) algorithm,
first circulated in Kim and Orphanides (2005).
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Survey-augmentation of GADTSMs aims to directly tackle the identification problem: two
inputs are used — actual bond yields and survey expectations of future short-term interest rates
— to separately identify two outputs — fitted yields and expected future short-term interest
rates, respectively. Kim and Orphanides (2012) document that, between 1990 and 2003, the
survey-augmented model does produce sensible estimates of interest rate expectations. However,
Lloyd (2017a) shows that estimated interest rate expectations from a survey-augmented model,
estimated using the algorithm of Guimara˜es (2014), perform poorly for the 2002-2016 period
relative to the OIS-augmented model, deviating markedly from market implied expectations
during the ELB period especially.
OIS-augmentation of GADTSMs is similar in philosophy to survey-augmentation, but offers
numerous advantages that result in superior estimates of risk-neutral yields and term premia.
Although survey expectations do help to address the informational insufficiency problem, they
are ill-equipped for the estimation of daily frequency expectations. Survey expectations of
future short-term interest rates are only available at a low frequency: quarterly or monthly,
at best. However, OIS rates are available at a daily frequency, so provide information for the
separate identification of risk-neutral yields at the same frequency at which they are estimated.
Moreover, Lloyd (2017b) documents that 1 to 24-month OIS rates, on average, provide accurate
measures of interest rate expectations in the US, UK, Japan, and the Eurozone. Lloyd (2017a)
argues that by using OIS rates at these tenors to augment the GADTSM, they provide valid
information with which to identify interest rate expectations. Lloyd (2017a) documents that
the interest rate expectation estimates from OIS-augmented models are superior to estimates
from existing GADTSMs, including the bias-corrected and survey-augmented models. In this
paper, I provide additional evidence to support this finding.
In the following sub-sections, I describe the data and algorithms I use to estimate the three
GADTSMs in this paper.17 I compare model-implied risk-neutral yields to comparable-horizon
federal funds futures rates and survey expectations, and show that the OIS-augmented model
provides superior estimates of interest rate expectations for the period of relevance to this paper.
3.1 Estimation of GADTSMs
To foster the closest possible comparison to the related literature, I compare the OIS-augmented
model to the survey-augmented (Kim and Wright, 2005) and bias-corrected (Bauer et al., 2012)
GADTSMs.18 The Kim and Wright (2005) data I use is publicly available and estimated with
daily frequency bond yield data from July 18, 1990 to December 31, 2015 with 3 and 6-month
T-Bill yields and 1, 2, 4, 7 and 10-year US Treasury zero-coupon bond yields (Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Wright, 2007).19 I estimate the bias-corrected model with the same data, using
the algorithm of Bauer et al. (2012, Section 4). Because US OIS rate data is only available
17See Lloyd (2017a) for a detailed exposition of GADTSM estimation algorithms.
18I use the survey-augmented model estimated by Kim and Wright (2005) estimated using the algorithm of
Kim and Orphanides (2012), first circulated in Kim and Orphanides (2005), as opposed to the survey-augmented
model estimated using the algorithm of Guimara˜es (2014), because the former of these is used by Gagnon et al.
(2011), perhaps the most widely referenced US LSAP event study to date.
19T-Bill rates are converted from their discount basis to the yield basis. Data sources are listed in appendix A.
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from late-2001, I estimate the OIS-augmented decomposition using data from January 2, 2002
to December 31, 2015 to isolate the benefits of OIS-augmentation, and using the same bond
maturities as in Lloyd (2017a).20 I use use 3, 6, 12 and 24-month OIS rates, as in the 4-
OIS-augmented model in Lloyd (2017a) (hereafter the ‘OIS-augmented decomposition’). Lloyd
(2017a) documents that this model risk-neutral yields that are superior to those from existing
GADTSMs, excluding Kim and Wright (2005), for the 2002-2016 period, exhibiting the lowest
root mean square error (RMSE) fit vis-a`-vis federal funds futures rates and survey expectations.
For each model, three pricing factors determine bond prices.21
Figure 1 presents the results from the three GADTSMs at the 2-year horizon. Panel A plots
the actual time series of the 2-year yield against the fitted values from the three GADTSMs
over the 2002-2015 period. The illustration corroborates an important finding in Lloyd (2017a):
GADTSM-augmentation does not compromise the overall fit of the model with respect to actual
bond yields. The series co-move extremely closely.22 As stated in Lloyd (2017a), this finding
is intuitive. Survey and OIS-augmentation have been proposed to improve the identification
of risk-neutral yields. Even in unaugmented GADTSMs, bond yield data is sufficient for the
accurate fitting of actual bond yields.
3.2 Interest Rate Expectations
Unlike fitted yields, panels B and C of figure 1 illustrate that the risk-neutral yields and term
premia from each of the GADTSMs differ markedly. The differences are a direct consequence
of the identification problem. The risk-neutral yields differ starkly from late-2008 onwards, the
period most relevant to this analysis. The 2-year risk-neutral yield from the survey-augmented
Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition remains persistently above 1% from December 2008
onwards, while the bias-corrected and OIS-augmented models attribute a greater proportion
of the fall in yields during 2008 to falling expectations of future short-term interest rates. In
fact, the 2-year risk-neutral yield from the bias-corrected model is persistently negative from
mid-2009 to late-2011, counter-factually implying that investors’ average expectation of future
short-term interest rates was negative. In contrast, the 2-year risk-neutral yield from the survey-
augmented and OIS-augmented models never fall negative.23
In figure 1, as in Lloyd (2017a), the 2-year term premium from the OIS-augmented model is
persistently negative from mid-2004 to mid-2008. This is a direct consequence of the accurate
fitting of risk-neutral yields. However, this feature is not true for all maturities; estimated term
premia at longer horizons are frequently and persistently positive.
To accurately attribute yield changes to signalling and portfolio rebalancing effects, it is nec-
203 and 6-month T-Bill rates and 12, 18, ..., 60, 84, and 120-month zero-coupon Treasury bond yields.
21Kim and Wright (2005) and Bauer et al. (2012) also use three pricing factors. Litterman and Scheinkman
(1991) demonstrate that the first three principal components of bond yields explain over 95% of their variation.
22The residuals of the fitted yields are extremely similar across models at all maturities.
23As in Lloyd (2017a) this is true at all horizons for the OIS-augmented model, despite the fact that additional
restrictions are not imposed on the model to prevent interest rate expectations from going negative. This
represents an important contribution in light of recent computationally burdensome proposals for term structure
modelling at the ELB (see, for example, Christensen and Rudebusch, 2013a,b).
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Figure 1: Estimated Yield Curve Decomposition: July 1990-December 2015
Note: In panel A, I plot the actual 2-year bond yield and fitted 2-year bond yields from each of three GADTSMs.
In panels B and C, I plot the estimated risk-neutral yields and term premia from the three GADTSMs, re-
spectively. The three models are: (i) the bias-corrected model of Bauer et al. (2012) (Bias-Corrected); (ii) the
survey-augmented model of Kim and Wright (2005) (Survey); and (iii) the OIS-augmented model of Lloyd (2017a)
(OIS). The bias-corrected and survey-augmented models are estimated using daily data from July 18, 1990 to
December 31, 2015. The OIS-augmented model is estimated using daily data from January 2, 2002 to December
31, 2015. All models use three pricing factors. All figures are in annualised percentage points.
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essary to attain accurate measures of the risk-neutral yields and term premia used to identify the
channels. With this goal in mind, I compare the model-implied interest rate expectations, from
the risk-neutral yields, to federal funds futures rates and survey expectations. The preferred
GADTSM should accurately reflect the qualitative and quantitative evolution of comparable-
horizon survey and market-implied expectations.
3.2.1 Risk-Neutral Yields and Federal Funds Futures Rates
I first compare the GADTSM-implied risk-neutral yields to federal funds futures (FFFs) rates.
FFFs rates have long been used as measures of investors’ expectations of future short-term
interest rates. A FFFs contract pays out at maturity based on the average effective federal
funds rate realised for the calendar month specified in the contract. The risk-neutral yields
from the preferred GADTSM should closely align with corresponding-maturity federal funds
futures rates for the post-2008 period relevant to this analysis. FFFs are available for the first
35 calendar months into the future (including the current month) and are often used to measure
interest rate expectations out to the 1-year horizon.
To compare GADTSM-implied interest rate expectations to FFFs rates, I perform the fol-
lowing steps.24 First, I construct a FFFs-implied expectation of the average short-term interest
rate over a 12-month period. To do this, I calculate the arithmetic mean of the 1, 2, ..., 12-month
ahead FFFs rates on the final day of each calendar month, generating a monthly frequency series
of average market-implied interest rate expectations over the subsequent 12-months.25 Second,
I compare the monthly frequency FFF-implied expectation to the corresponding-horizon 1-year
risk-neutral yield from each GADTSM on the final day of each calendar month.
Table 1 reports a root mean square error (RMSE) comparison of the FFF-implied and
GADTSM-implied expectations for three sample periods: January 2002 to December 2015;
the baseline SVAR sample period from November 2008 to April 2013; and November 2008 to
December 2015. On a RMSE basis, the OIS-augmented model unambiguously provides superior
estimates of expected future short-term interest rates, as measured by FFFs rates. Between
November 2008 and December 2015, the RMSE of the OIS-augmented model approximately
half of the RMSE of the survey-augmented model, and almost a third of the RMSE of the
bias-corrected model. For all three periods, the bias-corrected model provides the worst fit of
FFF-implied market expectations.
24Ideally, I would follow the steps in Lloyd (2017a, Section 6.2.1), and compare FFFs rates to model-implied
risk-neutral forward yields 1, 2, ..., 11 months ahead. However, because I do not estimate the survey-augmented
Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition, and because they do not report 1, 2, ..., 11-month risk-neutral yields, I
must alter the analysis from Lloyd (2017a). In Lloyd (2017a), I show that the OIS-augmented model performs
unambiguously better than other models at the 1, 2, ..., 11 month horizons.
25I only use FFFs rates on the final day of each calendar month due to the maturity structure of FFFs contracts
(see Lloyd, 2017b, for more details). An n-month contract traded on day ti of the calendar month t has the
same settlement period as an n-month contract traded on a different day tj in the same calendar month t. For
this reason, the horizon of the FFFs-implied expectation and the 1-year risk-neutral yield only align on the final
day of each calendar month. I use the arithmetic mean in accordance with FFFs market convention — see CME
Rulebook, Chapter 22, 22101: www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/V/22/22.pdf.
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Table 1: GADTSM-Implied Expectations: Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the 1-Year
Risk-Neutral Yield vis-a`-vis the Federal Funds Futures-Implied 1-Year Expectation
RMSE vs. 1-Year FFF-Implied Expectation
Sample
Model Jan. 2002 to
Dec. 2015
Nov. 2008 to
Apr. 2013
Nov. 2008 to
Dec. 2015
Bias-Corrected 0.5275 0.5386 0.4707
Survey-Augmented 0.3462 0.3521 0.3456
OIS-Augmented 0.2522 0.2138 0.1713
Note: RMSE of the 1-year risk-neutral yields from each of the three GADTSMs in comparison to
the federal funds futures-implied expectation. The three models are: (i) the bias-corrected model
(Bauer et al., 2012); (ii) the survey-augmented model (Kim and Wright, 2005); and (iii) the OIS-
augmented model (Lloyd, 2017a). The bias-corrected and survey-augmented models are estimated
using daily data from July 18, 1990 to December 31, 2015. The OIS-augmented model is estimated
using daily data from January 2, 2002 to December 31, 2015. All models use three pricing factors.
All figures are in annualised percentage points. The lowest RMSE model has been emboldened for
ease of reading.
3.2.2 Risk-Neutral Yields and Survey Expectations
I also compare the GADTSM-implied interest rate expectations to survey expectations. Because
survey expectations reflect respondents’ expectations of future short-term interest rates, the risk-
neutral yields from the preferred GADTSM should closely align with corresponding-maturity
survey expectations, especially during the post-2008 period of interest.
Formally, I compare the estimated 6-month and 1-year risk-neutral yields to corresponding-
horizon average short-term interest rate expectations from surveys.26 I calculate approximate
future short-term interest rate expectations using data from the quarterly Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. I construct the approximations
from a weighted geometric average of the median expectation of the 3-month T-Bill rate for the
remainder of the current quarter, and the first, second, third and fourth quarters ahead.27 To
compare the estimated risk-neutral yields to these survey expectations, I calculate the RMSE
of the risk-neutral yield vis-a`-vis the corresponding horizon survey expectation on survey sub-
mission deadline dates.
Table 2 presents the numerical results for the comparison of 6 and 12-month expectations.
The results indicate that the OIS-augmented GADTSM unambiguously provides the best fit for
survey expectations. Of particular note is the performance of the OIS-augmented model over
the baseline 2008 Q4 to 2013 Q2 sample most relevant to the subsequent analysis. Here the
RMSE fit of the 1-year survey expectation from the OIS-augmented model is almost one-third
of the RMSE fit of the survey-augmented model and around a quarter of the RMSE fit of the
bias-corrected model.
26Estimates of the Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition are only available for 1-year bond maturities, or
more, so I am unable to compare this to survey forecasts at the 6-month horizon. Nevertheless, I compare the
bias-corrected and OIS-augmented models at the 6-month horizon, to stress the superiority of OIS-augmentation
over the bias-corrected model at multiple horizons.
27A complete description of how these approximations are calculated is in Lloyd (2017a, Appendix B).
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Table 2: GADTSM-Implied Expectations: Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the In-Sample
Risk-Neutral Yields vis-a`-vis 6-Month and 1-Year Survey Expectations
Sample
Model 2002 Q1 to
2015 Q4
2008 Q4 to
2013 Q2
2008 Q4 to
2015 Q4
RMSE vs. 6-Month Survey Expectation
Bias-Corrected 0.2725 0.2977 0.2606
Survey-Augmented N/A N/A N/A
OIS-Augmented 0.1505 0.1132 0.0979
RMSE vs. 1-Year Survey Expectation
Bias-Corrected 0.4555 0.5016 0.4329
Survey-Augmented 0.2992 0.3519 0.3292
OIS-Augmented 0.1685 0.1400 0.1306
Note: RMSE of the risk-neutral yields from each of the three GADTSMs in comparison to approximated
survey expectations. The three models are: (i) the bias-corrected model (Bauer et al., 2012); (ii) the
survey-augmented model (Kim and Wright, 2005); and (iii) the OIS-augmented model (Lloyd, 2017a).
The bias-corrected and survey-augmented models are estimated using daily data from July 18, 1990
to December 31, 2015. The OIS-augmented model is estimated using daily data from January 2, 2002
to December 31, 2015. All models use three pricing factors. All figures are in annualised percentage
points. The lowest RMSE model at each maturity, for each sub-sample, has been emboldened for each
of reading.
Overall, the OIS-augmented decomposition provides superior estimates of interest rate ex-
pectations, in comparison to both FFFs rates and survey expectations. Hereafter, the OIS-
augmented model is deemed the preferred model of interest rate expectations.
4 Financial Market Impact of LSAPs and Forward Guidance
Before assessing the effect of shocks to longer-term interest rates on real economic outcomes,
I document the impact of LSAP and forward guidance announcements on interest rates by
carrying out an event study. To label the shocks identified in section 5 as the ‘signalling’
and ‘portfolio rebalancing’ effects of LSAPs and forward guidance, policy announcements must
have exerted a significant impact on the risk-neutral yield and term premium components of
longer-term bond yields. I verify this here.
Event studies are ubiquitous in the literature assessing the financial market effects of un-
conventional monetary policy. As is the norm, I evaluate the change in interest rates within
a one-day event window on event days where notable announcements pertaining to forward
guidance or the expansion of LSAPs occurred.
Event studies rely on the lumpy nature of monetary policy announcements. Although US
unconventional monetary policy announcements have occurred at different points in time and
at irregular intervals, they have been multifaceted and have become increasingly complex.28
Numerous policies have been announced in a single statement. For instance, on December 16,
28Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2014) note that the average word count for FOMC statements has increased
from around 200 words in 2008 to over 600 in 2013.
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2008, the Fed announced that the target range for the federal funds rate would be reduced
to 0-0.25%, that interest rates would be kept low “for some time”, and that LSAPs would be
continued. Thus, I study forward guidance and LSAPs jointly, as on some event days the effects
of the two are not separately identifiable.
My results extend upon the existing US unconventional monetary policy event study lit-
erature in three ways. First, this is the first study to apply the OIS-augmented yield curve
decomposition of Lloyd (2017a) to the analysis of macroeconomic policy at the ELB. Second, I
consider a longer sample period of events: from November 25, 2008 to April 2013, though the
last event date corresponding to expansionary monetary policy is December 12, 2012. Third,
the classification of events differs to those of Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2014) and Gilchrist,
Lo´pez-Salido, and Zakrajsek (2015), who are the only other authors to explicitly consider the
simultaneous occurrence of forward guidance and LSAP announcements on event days. These
authors classify the events in a binary manner, as either predominantly LSAP-related or forward
guidance-related. I add a third classification to account for event dates on which both notable
LSAP and forward guidance events took place. Admitting the joint impact of these policies
is especially important, as either policy is likely to contaminate event studies into the other.
For instance, in an LSAP-only event study, the sizeable reduction in US Treasury yields on
March 18, 2009 may be entirely attributed to the announced purchase of longer-term Treasuries
as part of QE1. However, on the same day the Fed altered its forward guidance from stating
that it would maintain the policy rate at its lower bound “for some time” to “an extended
period”. By defining this as a combined LSAP and forward guidance event, I explicitly capture
the multifaceted nature of unconventional monetary policy. Finally, I consider movements in
the risk-neutral yield and term premium at multiple horizons: specifically 2, 5 and 10 years.
Although movements in yields of different maturities are highly correlated, there is no a pri-
ori reason to expect changes in interest rate expectations to be equally important at all time
horizons. In fact, as forward guidance is often strongly linked — either explicitly when time-
dependent, or implicitly otherwise — to a 1 to 2-year horizon, it seems likely that signalling
effects will be most important at these tenors. Additionally, 10-year interest rate movements,
which are the sole focus of some existing LSAP event studies, may not be the most relevant for
economic activity. By additionally considering 2 and 5-year rates, I am better able to account
for heterogeneous effects of signalling and portfolio rebalancing across horizons.
Table 3 presents the list of 16 announcement dates that I consider. All announcements are
based on a set of official communications by the Fed and speeches by senior Fed officials, which
contained new information on unconventional policy. To select the events, I independently
scoured all Fed press releases.29 To be included in the event set, the news had to mark a
notable, broadly unanticipated change in LSAP or forward guidance policy. Many of the events
in the first half of the study corroborate with those in other event studies (Gagnon et al., 2011;
Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Filardo and Hofmann, 2014).
29These press releases are available here: www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/all/XXXXall.htm,
where XXXX should be replaced by the year of interest.
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Table 3: Event Set and Descriptions
# Date Description
I 25/11/2008 Initial LSAP announcement: LSAPs - Fed to purchase MBS and agency
bonds.GRRS,CR,W
II 01/12/2008 Bernanke speech: LSAPs - US Treasuries may be purchased.GRRS,CR,W,a
III 16/12/2008 FOMC statement: FG - “... weak economic conditions are likely to warrant excep-
tionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time”; LSAPs - Further mention
of possible Treasury purchases.GRRS,CR,W,FH
IV 28/01/2009 FOMC statement: LSAPs - “The Federal Reserve continues to purchase large quan-
tities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mort-
gage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand the quantity of such pur-
chases and the duration of the purchase program as conditions warrant”.GRRS,CR,W
V 18/03/2009 FOMC statement: FG - “... economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period”; LSAPs - Purchase of long-
term Treasuries announced.GRRS,CR,W,FH
VI 10/08/2010 FOMC statement: LSAPs - Fed to reinvest holdings of assets purchased under
‘QE1’ to keep overall value of asset stock constant.W
VII 27/08/2010 Bernanke speech at Jackson Hole: LSAPs - “additional purchases ... would be
effective”.W,b
VIII 21/09/2010 FOMC statement: LSAPs - Fed to reinvest holdings of assets purchased.W
IX 15/10/2010 Bernanke speech at Boston Fed: FG & LSAPs - “the FOMC is prepared to
provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery and to
return inflation over time to levels consistent with our mandate”.W,c
X 03/11/2010 FOMC statement: LSAPs - ‘QE2’ announced; $600bn purchase of long-term Trea-
suries over six months.
XI 09/08/2011 FOMC statement: FG - “... economic conditions ... are likely to warrant excep-
tionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013”; LSAPs - Fed
to reinvest holdings of assets purchased under ‘QE1’ and ‘QE2’ to keep overall value
of asset stock constant.W,FH
XII 26/08/2011 Bernanke speech at Jackson Hole: FG & LSAPs - “[T]he [Fed] has a range of
tools. ... We will continue to consider those”.W,d
XIII 25/01/2012 FOMC statement: FG - “... economic conditions ... are likely to warrant excep-
tionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014”.FH
XIV 31/08/2012 Bernanke speech at Jackson Hole: FG & LSAPs - “nontraditional policy tools
... can continue to be effective”.e
XV 13/09/2012 FOMC statement: FG - “... low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be
warranted at least through mid-2015”; LSAPs - ‘QE3’ announced.FH
XVI 12/12/2012 FOMC statement: FG - “... exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will
be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5 percent,
inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than half a
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term
inflation expectations continue to be well anchored”.FH
Abbreviations: LSAPs = Event date with LSAP news; FG = Event date with forward guidance announcement.
GRRS: In the baseline event set of Gagnon et al. (2011); CR: Included in the event set of Christensen and
Rudebusch (2012); W: Included in the important event set of Wright (2012); FH: Included in event set of Filardo
and Hofmann (2014).
For speeches, the source is www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/XX where XX is bernanke20081201a.htm
for a; bernanke20100827a.htm for b; bernanke20101015a.htm for c; bernanke20110826a.htm for d; and
bernanke20120831a.htm for e.
News source sampled from all Fed press releases 2008-2013: www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases.htm.
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4.1 Model-Free Evidence
I first consider the behaviour of Treasury yields and OIS rates on event days without a model
for investors’ interest rate expectations. This ‘model-free’ evidence is a useful benchmark for
comparing the results attained using formal yield curve decompositions.
OIS rates are particularly relevant for studies of the signalling channel of unconventional
monetary policy, as they are associated with investors’ expectations of the future short-term
interest rate path. Lloyd (2017b) explains how OIS rates theoretically reflect interest rate
expectations and demonstrates that, for the 2002-2016 period, US OIS contracts out to the
2-year horizon provide accurate information about investors’ expectations of future short-term
interest rates. Longer-maturity OIS rates include term premia that are increasing in contract
maturity, which mean this model-free evidence can only provide illustrative evidence on the
importance of signalling for the propagation of unconventional monetary policy.
I compare the changes in actual Treasury yields to comparable-horizon OIS rates on event
days. For the 2-year OIS rate, quantitative similarities in the daily changes of OIS and Treasury
rates indicate the existence of a common factor explaining the co-movement. Expectations of
future short-term interest rates, which are reflected in both OIS and Treasury rates, are a
prime candidate for this factor. However, because term premia are likely to contaminate daily
changes in 5 and 10-year OIS rates, a close co-movement between OIS and Treasury rates at
these horizons is less likely to be explained by a single common expectations factor.
Table 4 presents the results of the model-free event study, using US Treasury zero-coupon
yields from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) and OIS rates from Bloomberg. US unconventional monetary
policy announcements did have a significant impact on financial markets at a range of horizons.30
Treasury yields and OIS rates fell significantly on many of the event days. On the whole, the
results depict a hump-shaped response of the Treasury yield curve in reaction to news: the
largest cumulative fall in Treasury yields over the 16 announcement dates was at the 5-year
maturity. The cumulative responses of OIS rates do not exhibit such a defined hump-shaped
pattern across maturities. On LSAP-only and forward guidance-only event days, the cumulative
fall in OIS rates is increasing in contract maturity. Though, on all event days, the 5-year OIS
rate exhibits the largest cumulative fall, exceeding the 10-year figure by 0.75 basis points. The
differing response of the OIS maturity structure to news, vis-a`-vis Treasury yields, provides
illustrative evidence of the term premia that exist in longer maturity OIS contracts.
The primary finding from table 4 is that the spread between 2-year Treasury and OIS rates
moved very little on most event days. Changes in interest rate expectations are likely to have
acted as a common factor driving this co-movement, indicating an important role for signalling
effects in the transmission of US unconventional monetary policy to financial markets. Most
strikingly, the total change in 2-year OIS rates on LSAP event days is 75.81% (−58.60 basis
30To assess the significance of these daily changes, I control for other macroeconomic data releases. Formally,
the tests assess whether the change on an event date is significantly different to the average change on a non-event
day, controlling for macroeconomic data releases. See appendix B.2 for more details. Similar results are attained
when the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index, a summary measure of differences between economic data releases
(excluding monetary policy) and pre-announcement expectations, is used as a control variable.
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Table 4: One-Day Change in Actual US Treasury Yields and OIS Rates on Event Dates
# Event Date Maturity - All Figures in Basis Points
& 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
Description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ yld2 ∆ i
ois
2 ∆ yld5 ∆ i
ois
5 ∆ yld10 ∆ i
ois
10
I 25/11/2008 L -14.35*** -13.80*** -22.50*** -24.80*** -21.38*** -28.10***
II 01/12/2008 L -11.86*** -12.80*** -21.42*** -20.70*** -21.55*** -19.10***
III 16/12/2008 F,L -10.72*** -15.25*** -16.26*** -28.55*** -17.48*** -31.75***
IV 28/01/2009 L +4.57*** +5.60*** +10.11*** +10.70*** +12.04*** +13.65***
V 18/03/2009 F,L -26.41*** -12.00*** -47.08*** -26.70*** -51.88*** -37.70***
VI 10/08/2010 L -2.69** -1.20 -7.09*** -5.30*** -6.87*** -4.40***
VII 27/08/2010 L +5.40*** +5.10*** +12.30*** +13.00*** +16.64*** +18.30***
VIII 21/09/2010 L -3.71*** -4.05*** -9.57*** -10.30*** -10.73*** -12.40***
IX 15/10/2010 F,L -1.21** -0.50*** +2.61*** +1.80*** +8.62*** +4.30***
X 03/11/2010 L -1.52*** -0.70*** -4.04*** -3.10*** +4.07*** -1.70***
XI 09/08/2011 F,L -8.56*** -5.95*** -19.09*** -10.35*** -20.50*** -8.60***
XII 26/08/2011 F,L -1.70 -0.75 -4.21 -4.65*** -3.50 -6.00
XIII 25/01/2012 F -3.77*** -1.40*** -9.39*** -10.45*** -8.03*** -5.70***
XIV 31/08/2012 F,L -3.67*** -1.10*** -6.43*** -7.00*** -7.02*** -7.10***
XV 13/09/2012 F,L -0.86 -1.20 -3.70*** -4.80*** -2.93*** -5.60***
XVI 12/12/2012 F +0.03 +0.25** +2.25*** +2.65*** +5.71*** +4.10***
Total Change on Event Days
LSAP Events -77.30 -58.60 -136.37 -120.75 -122.47 -126.20
(∆ iois ÷ ∆ yld) (75.81%) (88.55%) (103.05%)
FG Events -56.89 -37.90 -101.30 -88.05 -97.02 -94.05
(∆ iois ÷ ∆ yld) (66.62%) (86.92%) (96.94%)
All Events -81.05 -59.75 -143.51 -128.55 -124.79 -127.80
(∆ iois ÷ ∆ yld) (73.72%) (89.58%) (102.41%)
Notes: L = Event date with LSAP news; F = Event date with forward guidance announcement; ∆yldn =
Change in actual n-year zero-coupon bond yield on event days; ∆ioisn : Change in actual n-year OIS rate on
event days. Tests to determine the significance of daily changes are described in appendix B.2; t-statistics are
calculated using Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Daily changes that are significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * respectively. Data Sources: Appendix A.
points) of the cumulative change in the 2-year Treasury yield (−77.30 basis points) on the same
event days. The corresponding percentages for the forward guidance-only events and all events
are 66.62% and 73.72% at the 2-year horizon. At the 5 and 10-year horizons the ratios of the
cumulative falls in OIS rates to Treasury yields are higher than for the 2-year tenor. However,
these figures are likely to reflect significant term premia within OIS contracts in addition to a
common expectations factor, motivating the subsequent GADTSM-based study.
Treasury yields and OIS rates fell significantly on most event days.31 However, on some
event days, Treasury and OIS rates increased (e.g. IV, VII, IX, and XVI),32 and their moves
were statistically insignificant on other days (e.g. XII). Nevertheless, the conclusions are robust
31Although yields fell by more on event XII than on other days (e.g. X), the statistical insignificance of the
changes occurs because a preliminary US GDP release occurred on the same date. Preliminary US GDP releases
also occurred on days I and VII, but the yield moves on these days were larger and, thus, statistically significant.
32Appendix B.1 explains why Treasury yields increased on these event days with reference to news reports.
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to the removal of these dates from the event set. When event days IV, VII, IX, XII and XVI
are not included, the cumulative fall in the 2-year Treasury yield is 88.12 basis points, while
the 2-year OIS rate cumulatively falls by 69.45 basis points. The 5 and 10-year Treasury yields
fell by 166.57 and 164.30 basis points, respectively, on the remaining 11 event days, while the 5
and 10-year OIS rates declined by 152.05 and 162.15 basis points in turn.
Tables 4 also provides some indication of the changing efficacy of unconventional monetary
policy announcements over time. In particular, actual Treasury yields fell most in response
to earlier policy announcements, linked with QE1. The largest fall in Treasury yields came on
event day V, when the Fed announced the extension of QE1 to include the purchase of long-term
Treasuries, and altered their forward guidance from stating that the federal funds rate would
remain low, from “for some time” to “an extended period.” The introduction of calendar-based
forward guidance on event day XI was the only to depress bond yields by a similar order of
magnitude to the early announcements.
4.2 Event Study Results
To explicitly consider the reaction of interest rate expectations and term premia to policy
announcements, I perform an event study using the three GADTSM decompositions described in
section 3. As in the existing literature, the risk-neutral yields are associated with the signalling
channel and term premia with portfolio rebalancing. The results are reported in tables 5,
6 and 7 for the 2, 5 and 10-year yields respectively. To assess the statistical significance of
daily changes, I control for major US macroeconomic data release dates.33 All three tables
indicate that changes in fitted yields and their sub-components on event days were sizeable,
and statistically significant on many event dates. Notably, both the signalling and portfolio
balance channels are shown to be operative, albeit to differing degrees at different horizons and
with different yield curve decompositions.
Figure 2 graphically depicts the headline results. It plots the cumulative fall in actual 2,
5 and 10-year yields (denoted by a cross) along with the cumulative fall in fitted yields, risk-
neutral yields and term premia from the three term structure models on the 11 event days when
bond yields fell significantly. These 11 dates exclude events IV, VII, IX, XII and XVI, when
fitted yields either increased or fell insignificantly. The graph demonstrates that the survey-
augmented decomposition attributes a greater proportion of variation in fitted yields to the
term premium, and thus portfolio rebalancing. It attributes 84.01% of the cumulative fall in
the 2-year fitted yield on the 11 event days to the term premium, the highest proportion of
the three models at this maturity. The corresponding figures for the 5 and 10-year horizons
are 71.05% and 70.91% respectively. However, for the reasons outlined in section 3, the results
from the survey-augmented decomposition over-attribute variation in fitted yields to the term
premium, falsely overstating the efficacy of the portfolio balance channel relative to signalling.
Although the bias-corrected decomposition attributes a lesser percentage of fitted yield
variation to term premia at all three horizons than the survey-augmented decomposition on all 16
33See appendix B.2 for further details.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Fall in Yields on 11 Event Days with Statistically Significant Falls in
Fitted Yields
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
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Change Actual Yield
Note: Plot of the cumulative fall in actual yields, fitted yields, risk-neutral yields and term premia on 11 event
days with statistically significant falls in fitted yields. The 11 dates exclude events IV, VII, IX, XII and XVI.
The remaining 11 event days are listed in table 3. The cumulative fall in actual 2, 5 and 10-year yields is
denoted by a black cross. The cumulative fall in fitted 2, 5 and 10-year yields from the bias-corrected (‘BC’)
(Bauer et al., 2012), survey-augmented (‘Survey’) (Kim and Wright, 2005) and OIS-augmented (‘OIS’) (Lloyd,
2017a) GADTSMs are depicted in the bars. The upper, dark, segment of each bar depicts the cumulative fall in
risk-neutral yields — the signalling channel (‘Sig.’). The lower, light, segment of each bar depicts the cumulative
fall in term premia — the portfolio balance channel (‘PB’).
event dates, it attributes the greatest proportion of variation in fitted yields to the term premium
at the 5 and 10-year horizons on the 11 dates when fitted yields fell significantly. At the 2, 5
and 10-year horizons the bias-corrected decomposition respectively attributes 71.89%, 85.63%
and 97.24% of the cumulative fall in fitted yields term premia, and thus portfolio rebalancing,
on these 11 days.
The preferred OIS-augmented decomposition highlights a powerful role for signalling at all
horizons. Of the cumulative fall in fitted yields at the 2, 5 and 10-year horizons on the 11
event days with significant falls in fitted yields, the OIS-augmented decomposition respectively
attributes 95.49%, 88.71% and 68.49% to falls in risk-neutral yields and thus signalling. The
corresponding figures for the complete set of 16 event dates are 95.29%, 90.61% and 74.19%. The
OIS-augmented model attributes the greatest proportion of variation to signalling at the 2-year
horizon. But in terms of absolute size, the reaction of risk-neutral yields is hump-shaped with
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respect to bond maturity. The 2-year risk-neutral yield fell by a total of 87.51 basis points on the
11 event days, while the 5 and 10-year figures were 122.72 and 94.57 basis points respectively,
indicating that interest rate expectations were affected well beyond the 2-year horizon. The
relative and absolute size of term premium changes are increasing in maturity, reflecting greater
importance of risk at longer horizons.
Tables 5-7 provide a more detailed breakdown of the event study, allowing a comparison
of LSAP and forward guidance event days. For all three maturities, falls in risk-neutral yields
from the OIS-augmented decomposition explain a marginally larger proportion of falls in fitted
yields on forward guidance event days than LSAP event days. For instance, falls in risk-neutral
yields explain 91.31% of the reduction in the 5-year fitted yield on forward guidance days, and
89.96% on LSAP days. However, this comparison is blurred because most forward guidance
events also included some information about LSAPs. Nevertheless, it is particularly striking
that proportional expectations effects were strong on LSAP-only event days (events I, II, VI,
VIII and X especially). For instance, on event date VIII, when the Fed announced it would
reinvest maturing assets to maintain the stock of asset purchases, over 60% of the fall in the
10-year fitted yield is attributed to a reduction in the risk-neutral yield.
Tables 5-7 indicate some interesting differences between each of the three yield curve de-
compositions on specific event days too. For example, on event day II (December 1, 2008), Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that “US Treasuries may be purchased” as part of the LSAP
program. The survey-augmented decomposition attributes just 15% of the fall in the 2-year
fitted yield on that day to the risk-neutral yield, whereas the OIS-augmented model attributes
around 94% to the fall in the risk-neutral yield. According to this latter decomposition, the
signalling effect of this announcement was more pronounced. Similar differences exist on event
day V (March 18, 2009), when the Fed stated that low interest rates would likely be warranted
for “an extended period” and announced the purchase of longer-term Treasuries as part of the
LSAP program. On this day, the bias-corrected and survey-augmented models respectively at-
tribute 19% and 16% of the fall in the 2-year fitted yield to the risk-neutral yield. In contrast,
the corresponding figure for the OIS-augmented decomposition is 96%.
In sum, the event study evidence indicates that different yield curve decompositions provide
differing conclusions about the relative efficacy of signalling and portfolio rebalancing. Using
the preferred OIS-augmented model, I find that unconventional monetary policy announcements
had particularly powerful signalling effects on financial markets, explaining between 68.49% and
95.49% of the cumulative decline in bond yields on announcement days.
5 Signalling, Portfolio Rebalancing and the Real Economy
To assess the relative importance of signalling and portfolio rebalancing effects of unconventional
monetary policy for the real economy, I identify the shocks with a combination of zero-impact
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ŷ
ld
2
∆
êx
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and sign restrictions within a structural vector autoregression (SVAR).34
5.1 SVAR Methodology
The baseline reduced-form VAR, labelled model 1, consists of four monthly time series:
Yt =
[
ipt, pt, exp
(j)
t , tp
(j)
t
]′
(2)
where ipt is the logarithm of industrial production and pt is the logarithm of the consumer price
index (CPI).35 Because the federal funds futures rate reached its ELB in December 2008, I do
not include this in the set of variables. Instead, I use the components of longer-term interest
rates to indicate the stance of monetary policy over the sample period. exp
(j)
t represents the
monthly average of the j-year risk-neutral yield estimated from one of the three GADTSMs
described in section 3, while tp
(j)
t denotes the monthly average of the j-year term premium
from the same GADTSM. In accordance with the existing unconventional monetary policy
VAR literature (e.g. Baumeister and Benati, 2013; IMF, 2013; Lloyd, 2013), I use the 10-year
US Treasury yield in my baseline analysis. To assess the robustness of my results, I also run
the SVAR with decompositions of different horizon yields.
I estimate the VAR using data from November 2008 to April 2013, the period in which
LSAP and forward guidance announcements occurred and policy rates were at the ELB.36 In
line with the Schwarz-Bayes information criterion, the lag order of the VAR is two.
To further assess the robustness of my results, I account for additional channels through
which LSAPs and forward guidance may transmit to the real economy. I control for each
additional channel in turn.
I account for the credit channel by extending the baseline VAR (2) to form a five-variable
system, labelled model 2:
Yt =
[
ipt, pt, exp
(j)
t , tp
(j)
t , credt
]′
(3)
where credt is the logarithm of US bank credit, a measure of bank lending.
Model 3 accounts for international effects. Bauer and Neely (2012) argue that the exchange
rate channel of unconventional monetary policy works through international interest rate differ-
entials, so is a component of signalling and portfolio balance channels. For this reason, I omit
real exchange rate from models 1 and 2. However, in model 3, I assess the robustness of my
findings to the inclusion of international factors:
Yt =
[
ipt, pt, exp
(j)
t , tp
(j)
t , rert
]′
(4)
34To impose these restrictions, I use the algorithm of Binning (2013). Arias, Rubio-Ramı´rez, and Waggoner
(2014) state that this algorithm for zero-impact and sign restrictions does not impose extra hidden sign restrictions
on the model, unlike other existing approaches.
35Data sources are provided in appendix A. Variables are included in (log) levels, consistent with Sims, Stock,
and Watson (1990) who show that parameter estimates from a VAR with potentially non-stationary log-level
variables (e.g. ipt and pt) are consistent.
36The November 2008 sample start date is defined by the first LSAP announcement in table 3. The April 2013
sample end date is chosen because of the May 2013 ‘taper tantrum’. Nevertheless, the results are robust when
December 2015 is chosen as the end date.
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where rert represents the logarithm of the effective exchange rate series for the US against 60
other countries.37
5.2 Sign Restrictions
For the baseline specification (2), I identify four structural shocks: aggregate demand; aggre-
gate supply; signalling; and portfolio rebalancing. It is important that these structural shocks
are separately identified, posing a challenge for the identification of signalling and portfolio
balance shocks. Given this, I assess the robustness of my results to two identification schemes,
summarised in table 8.
Table 8: Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 for the Four Variable VAR (2) - Model 1
Variables
Schemes 1 & 2 Scheme 1 Scheme 2
Shock ip p exp(j) tp(j) exp(j) tp(j)
Demand > 0 > 0 > 0 · > 0 ·
Supply > 0 < 0 · · · ·
Signalling 0 0 > 0 · > 0 0
Portfolio Balance 0 0 0 > 0 · > 0
· denotes an unrestricted response. 0 denotes a response that is restricted to
zero in the month of the shock. < (>) denotes a response that is strictly
negative (positive) in the month of the shock.
To identify the first two structural shocks, to aggregate demand and supply, I appeal to
a standard set of sign restrictions used in a number of studies of conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy (e.g. Baumeister and Benati, 2013). For these shocks, I use the same
identification restrictions in schemes 1 and 2. A positive demand shock must increase indus-
trial production and the price level. Moreover, since the shock should tighten future monetary
policy (conventional or unconventional), I impose that the expected future path of short-term
interest rates exp(j) must also increase. A supply shock must have opposing effects on industrial
production and the price level, while the response of all other variables is left unrestricted.
Signalling and portfolio balance shocks emanate from changes in the expected future short-
term interest rate component exp(j) and the term premium tp(j) respectively. Section 4.2 showed
that unconventional monetary policy announcements did significantly reduce both components
of longer-term yields, ratifying the assumption that shocks to these components in the VAR
can be associated with policy. The effects of these two shocks on industrial production and
the price level are the same for identification schemes 1 and 2. Contractionary signalling or
portfolio balance shocks are constrained to have no effect on industrial production or the price
level on impact to ensure that the time path of their reaction to shocks is realistic. Thereafter,
the sign of the shock is unconstrained. This is a useful feature, because the sign and size of
37An increase in rert corresponds to an appreciation of the US real exchange rate.
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the responses of industrial production and the price level to signalling and portfolio rebalancing
shocks will be used as metrics to gauge the relative efficacy of the two sub-channels.
To separately identify the signalling and portfolio balance shocks, the exp(j) and tp(j)
columns of table 8 must differ. In identification scheme 1, I impose that the portfolio bal-
ance shock has no instantaneous impact on the expected future path of short-term interest
rates. This is labelled a ‘pure term premium shock’, such that shocks to the term premia on a
j-period bond do not alter investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates over the
same horizon with a given month. To assess the sensitivity of my results to this restriction, I
impose its converse in scheme 2: signalling shocks cannot exert a contemporaneous impact on
the term premium. This is labelled a ‘pure expectations shock’. Of the two schemes, scheme 1 is
most plausible. The term premium includes interest rate risk, which is likely to be immediately
influenced by the signalling shock. However, to the extent that both expectations and term
premia significantly responded to unconventional monetary policy announcements, scheme 1
may provide a more realistic quantitative assessment of signalling shocks, while scheme 2 may
be better suited to capturing portfolio rebalancing shocks.
When controlling for bank credit and the real exchange rate in models 2 and 3, I do not
identify additional shocks. In model 2, I restrict the impact response of bank credit to signalling
and portfolio rebalancing shocks to zero, motivated by evidence that bank lending reacts to
monetary policy with a lag (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). The response of bank credit in
subsequent periods is unrestricted in size and sign. For model 3, I impose that the real exchange
rate must depreciate on impact in response to expansionary signalling and portfolio rebalancing
shocks, but leave the response thereafter unrestricted. This is motivated by evidence that
nominal exchange rates depreciated in response to US LSAP surprises (Glick and Leduc, 2012),
implying real exchange rate depreciation in the presence of price stickiness.
5.3 SVAR Results
The sign-restricted SVAR results show that, contrary to the prior beliefs of policymakers
(Bernanke, 2010), reductions in longer-term interest rates between November 2008 and April
2013 have exerted a more powerful effect on US industrial production via the signalling channel.
5.3.1 Model 1: 4 Variable SVAR
Figures 3 and 4 present the median impulse response functions, together with the 5% and 95%
confidence intervals, for the signalling and portfolio rebalancing shocks from model 1, estimated
using the preferred OIS-augmented 10-year yield decomposition. To foster comparison, the
median shocks are normalised to represent a 10 basis point fall in the corresponding yield
component.38 Within the VAR, the average proportion of historical variation in industrial
38The median response of the expectations (term premium) component for a signalling (portfolio rebalancing)
shock is similar in quantity. The two responses have been equalised to enable discussion of the effects of equal-sized
shocks. I use a residual-based block bootstrap with 1000 replications and 100 rotations per bootstrap, which
Bru¨ggemann, Jentsch, and Trenkler (2016) demonstrate leads to asymptotically valid inference on structural
impulse response functions in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity, unlike a wild or pairwise bootstrap.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 1 using Sign Restriction
Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 10-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes are
detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the
5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
production attributed to the two long-term interest rate shocks is 29.5% and 5.4% under schemes
1 and 2 respectively.
Figure 3 documents that the signalling shock has a significant lagged positive effect on
industrial production and CPI using both identification schemes. With scheme 1, the response
of industrial production is significantly positive 9 to 11 months after the shock, peaking at
0.19% after 9 months. The peak response of industrial production under scheme 2, the pure
expectations shock, is larger at 0.30% after 8 months, and the impulse response is significantly
positive 6 to 27 months after the shock. The CPI also significantly increases 3 to 15 months
after the shock under scheme 1, and 3 to 31 months under scheme 2. Its peak responses, 5
months after the shock, are 0.17% and 0.23% under schemes 1 and 2 respectively.
In contrast to the signalling shock, the responses of industrial production and CPI to an
expansionary portfolio rebalancing shock in figure 4 are statistically insignificant at all horizons.
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 1 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent
a 10 basis point fall in the 10-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd,
2017a). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
Moreover, their peak responses are considerably smaller than their responses to the signalling
shock. Under scheme 1, the pure term premium shock, the peak responses of industrial pro-
duction and CPI are 0.09% and 0.01% respectively. The corresponding figures for scheme 2 are
0.03% and 0.06%. All are insignificantly different from zero. Comparing the peak responses of
industrial production to the two shocks indicates that the signalling shock explains 68% to 91%
of the total peak industrial production effect due to the long-term interest rate shocks.
The signalling shock also accounts for a greater proportion of industrial production forecast
error variation than the portfolio rebalancing shock in the year following a shock under both
identification schemes. With scheme 1, the signalling shock explains 77.8% of industrial produc-
tion forecast error variation attributed to the two long-term interest rate shocks after 3 months.
Although the peak figure under scheme 2 is smaller, the signalling shock, on average, explains
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58.4% of industrial production forecast error variation due to the long-term interest rate shocks
in the 12-month period after the perturbation. Thus, the signalling channel is associated with
around two-thirds to three-quarters of the total effects of long-term interest rate shocks on US
industrial production between November 2008 and April 2013.
In summary, when model 1 is estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition of the
10-year Treasury yield, the signalling channel is associated with the majority of total industrial
production effects attributed to shocks to longer-term interest rates. Appendix C.1 presents
robustness exercises. It illustrates that the results strengthen when a longer sample period
(November 2008 to December 2015) is used. Extending the sample period makes the effects
of the signalling shock on industrial production and CPI stronger and significant for a longer
horizon. The results are also robust to the use of different maturity yields and different yield
curve decompositions. Even for the 2-year survey-augmented model, which attributes a smaller
fraction of variation in interest rates to signalling in the event study, the signalling shock
has stronger effects on industrial production and CPI than the portfolio rebalancing shock.
The results are also robust to using the 2-year OIS rate, instead of the 2-year risk-neutral
yield, alongside the 2-year term premium in the VAR. This robustness check accounts for the
possibility that, because both the risk-neutral yield and the term premium are estimated within
the same GADSTM, they do not vary independently.
5.4 Models 2 and 3: Adding Controls
Here, I present the results from models 2 and 3, which control for bank credit and real exchange
rates respectively, using the OIS-augmented decomposition of the 10-year yield. As for model 1,
these results also strengthen when a longer sample period (November 2008 to December 2015)
is used, and are also robust to the use of different maturity yields and different yield curve
decompositions. These robustness exercises are presented in appendix C.2.
Figures 5 and 6 present the impulse response functions for model 2, which controls for
bank credit, estimated with the OIS-augmented decomposition of the 10-year Treasury yield.
The results lend further support to those from model 1. The signalling shock has significantly
positive expansionary effects on industrial production and CPI. With scheme 1, the response of
industrial production is significantly positive 7 to 9 months after the shock, peaking at 0.19%
after 9 months. Similarly, under scheme 2, the pure expectations shock, industrial production’s
response is significantly positive 8 to 13 months after the shock, peaking at 0.25% after 10
months. The impulse response of CPI is also significantly positive 3 to 13 months after the
shock under scheme 1, and 4 to 19 months after the shock under scheme 2. The peak responses
are 0.16% after 5 months with scheme 1, and 0.18% after 5 months with scheme 2.
Bank credit significantly increases with a lag in response to the expansionary signalling
shock. Its impulse response is significantly positive 12 to 21 months after the shock with
scheme 1, and 15 to 25 months after the shock under scheme 2. The peak bank credit response
is 0.14% after 18 months, and 0.16% after 20 months under schemes 1 and 2 respectively.
Figure 6 demonstrates that the impulse responses of industrial production and CPI to the
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 2 using Sign Restriction
Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 10-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes are
detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the
5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
portfolio rebalancing shock remain insignificantly different from zero when the VAR is extended
to include bank credit as a control variable. As well as being statistically insignificant, the peak
responses of industrial production are smaller than their counterparts from figure 5. The peak
industrial production responses to the portfolio rebalancing shock are 0.07% after 3 and 7 months
under schemes 1 and 2 respectively, less than half of the peak responses to signalling shocks.
Comparing these figures to the peak responses of industrial production to the signalling shock
indicates that the signalling shock explains around three-quarters of the total peak industrial
production effect due to the long-term interest rate shocks.
The VAR results also indicate that portfolio rebalancing shocks had smaller expansionary
effects on bank credit than signalling shocks. The peak bank credit increase is 0.13% after 5
months and 0.07% after 11 months under schemes 1 and 2 respectively. Under both schemes,
the response of bank credit is insignificantly different from zero at all horizons.
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 2 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent
a 10 basis point fall in the 10-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd,
2017a). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
The impulse response functions for model 3, which includes the real exchange rate, are pre-
sented in figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 demonstrates that the signalling shock has a significantly
positive and lagged effect on industrial production and CPI under scheme 2. This pure expec-
tations shock generates a significantly positive increase in industrial production 6 to 10 months
after the shock, peaking at 0.47% after 7 months. Following the same shock, the peak CPI
response is 0.25% after 4 months, and the responses are significantly positive from 3 to 6 and
13 to 39 months after the shock. As in models 1 and 2, the peak industrial production response
following a signalling shock is smaller under scheme 1 than scheme 2. In model 3 with scheme
1, the peak is 0.20% after 8 months, although this is statistically insignificant using 5% and
95% confidence intervals. Nevertheless, the response of CPI to a signalling shock under scheme
1 is significantly positive 3 to 25 months after the shock, peaking at 0.14% after 4 months.
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 3 using Sign Restriction
Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 10-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes are
detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the
5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
Under scheme 2, the peak response of industrial production to a signalling shock is the
highest of all three models at 0.47%. This is likely to be explained by the response of the real
exchange rate, which depreciates significantly on impact, and for the subsequent two months.
This depreciation could stimulate industrial production through a trade balance channel. In-
terestingly, under scheme 1 which allows the term premium to respond to the signalling shock
contemporaneously, the depreciation of the real exchange rate is not significant at any horizon,
except on impact, and the response of industrial production is quantitatively smaller. This
indicates that the responsiveness of the term premium to unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncements may have different implications for exchange rate movements than changes in
expected future interest rates.
Figure 8 demonstrates that the impulse responses of industrial production and CPI to a port-
folio rebalancing shock are not significantly positive at any horizon when the VAR is extended
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 3 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent
a 10 basis point fall in the 10-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd,
2017a). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
to include the real exchange rate as a control variable. In response to the portfolio rebalancing
shock under both restriction schemes, the real exchange rate depreciates significantly on impact
as the identification restrictions impose, but its response thereafter is insignificantly different
from zero.
The robustness exercises here, together with those in appendix C.1 and C.2, strongly indicate
that shocks to expected future short-term interest rates have larger and more significant effects
on industrial production and CPI than shocks to term premia. Thus, the signalling channel is
associated with the majority of total industrial production and CPI effects attributed to shocks
to longer-term interest rates over the November 2008 to April 2013 sample period. Across the
three models the signalling channel is associated with around two-thirds to three-quarters of
the industrial production effects attributed to the two channels.
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6 Conclusion
In response to financial turmoil and the ELB for the short-term nominal policy rate, the Fed
enacted a number of ‘unconventional’ monetary policies, notably LSAPs and forward guidance.
Both can transmit to the real economy via longer-term interest rates through two sub-channels:
signalling and portfolio rebalancing. In this paper, I ask: through which of these channels —
signalling or portfolio rebalancing — did US unconventional monetary policy have the most
expansionary effects on output? I conclude that signalling shocks exerted a more powerful
influence on US industrial production and consumer prices than portfolio rebalancing effects.
The findings are important because the two channels offer differing implications for monetary
policy. Signalling implies that policy is most effective when investors anticipate that the central
bank will keep short-term interest rates lower for longer. Portfolio rebalancing requires the
large scale of LSAPs in order to generate sufficient portfolio substitution to reduce yields and
influence activity in the real economy during periods of sizeable financial turmoil.
In reaching my conclusion, I offer solutions to two challenges: the yield curve decomposition
associated with signalling and portfolio rebalancing, and the identification of signalling and
portfolio balance shocks.
In response to the first challenge, I use the OIS-augmented decomposition proposed by Lloyd
(2017a). This is the first paper to use this decomposition to assess the effects of macroeconomic
policy at the ELB. I provide further evidence in support of the conclusions in Lloyd (2017a):
the OIS-augmented GADTSM provides risk-neutral yields that closely align with the interest
rate expectations implied by FFFs and surveys. Using these daily frequency decompositions
of the yield curve, I find that the signalling effects of unconventional monetary policy were
particularly powerful at horizons in excess of 2 years. Monetary policy can have powerful effects
on longer-term interest rate expectations. Signalling effects explain around two-thirds to three-
quarters of the falls in 10-year bond yields on unconventional monetary policy announcement
days. The result highlights the economic importance of the signalling effects of unconventional
monetary policy announcements, implying that clear communication is likely to be an important
determinant of the macroeconomic impact of central bank balance sheet normalisation.
In response to the second challenge, I identify shocks using two combinations of sign and
zero-impact restrictions within an SVAR. I find that the signalling channel is associated with
around two-thirds to three-quarters of the total peak effects of long-term interest rate shocks
on US industrial production between November 2008 and April 2013.
The main conclusion of this paper is that, as a result of reductions in longer-term interest
rates between November 2008 and April 2013, the greatest benefits for industrial production
and consumer prices were attributable to signalling. Thus, my findings suggest that current
and future unconventional monetary policy action by the Fed may reap greater real economic
benefits if combined with clear communication about the future short-term interest rate path.
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Appendix
A Data Sources
Event Study and GADTSM Decomposition Data Sources
Data Series Description and Source
US Treasury Yields US Treasury bill yields of 3 and 6 month maturities, from the Fed-
eral Reserve statistical release H.15: http://www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/h15/data.htm. US Treasury zero-coupon bond yields
from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) of the following maturities:
1, 2, 4, 7 and 10 years. Available here: http://www.federalreserve.
gov/econresdata/researchdata/feds200628.xls.
US OIS Rates I use US OIS rates of 1, 2, 5 and 10 year maturities for the event study
in table 4. The OIS-augmented GADTSM decomposition includes OIS
rate data of maturity: 3 and 6 months; 1 and 2 years. The data is from
Bloomberg with the codes: 3-month USSOC ; 6-month USSOF ; 1-year
USSO1 ; 2-year USSO2 ; 5-year USSO5 ; and 10-year USSO10.
Survey-Augmented
GADTSM Decomposition
The survey-augmented GADTSM decomposition is due to Kim and
Wright (2005). The data is available at: http://www.federalreserve.
gov/econresdata/researchdata/feds200533.xls.
Survey Data Survey data is from the Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, accessible
here: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/
real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/.
SVAR Data Sources
Var. Description and Source
ip Monthly US industrial production series from St. Louis FRED.
p Monthly consumer price index (CPI) from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (www.
bls.gov/cpi/#data; ID: CUSR0000SA0).
ffr Effective federal funds rate from the Federal Reserve website.
exp(j) Risk-Neutral Component of j-year US Treasury Yield — author’s own calculation, except
for Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition
tp(j) Term Premium Component of j-year US Treasury Yield — author’s own calculation, except
for Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition
cred US Bank credit from the Federal Reserve (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/
current/; table H.8, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the US).
rer Broad effective real exchange rate for the US against 60 other economies from the Bank of
International Settlements (BIS): www.bis.org/statistics/eer/.
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B Event Study
B.1 Event-Specific Explanations
Table 9: Detailed Explanation of Increase in Bond Yields on Event Days IV, VII, IX and XVI
# Date Explanation
IV 28/01/2009 On this date, the Fed announced continued asset purchases and a readiness to expand
the programme if conditions warranted. The increase in bond yields and OIS rates
on this date can be rationalised when considering the pre-announcement expectations
of market participants. Anecdotal evidence indicates that market participants were
disappointed by the lack of concrete language regarding the possibility and timing
of purchases of longer-dated Treasury securities. Sources: Neely (2010); Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014).
VII 27/08/2010 On this date, Chairman Bernanke spoke at Jackson Hole, stating that “additional
purchases [...] would be effective.” According to Reuters, ““[T]he overall tone [of the
speech] was one of watch and wait,” Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius wrote
in a note to clients. [...] Stocks initially fell after Bernanke’s remarks, but reversed
course and three major indexes closed up 1.7 percent.” On the same day, the US
Commerce Department cut its estimate for US GDP in 2010 Q2 from 2.4% to 1.6%,
but this was higher than the 1.4% surveys had predicted. Source: in.reuters.com/
article/columns-us-usa-fed-bernanke-idINTRE67O0MF20100828.
IX 15/10/2010 On this date, Chairman Bernanke said the central bank has “a case for further action”
to stimulate the economy, citing high unemployment and low inflation. However, mar-
kets did not learn specifics on future LSAPs from the speech. “We’re still no closer to
knowing exactly what the so-called QE2 program might involve, in particular what
amount of Treasury securities the Fed could end up buying,” said Paul Ashworth,
an economist at Capital Economics. Although stocks opened higher after Chairman
Bernanke’s speech, the tone cooled as investors received other economic news, includ-
ing US sales growth of 0.6% in September 2010, which was higher than anticipated.
Source: money.cnn.com/2010/10/15/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm.
XVI 12/12/2012 On this date, the Fed announced state-dependent threshold-based forward guidance.
Contemporary news reports stated that this was “aggressively dovish”, indicating
that the policy was perceived to be expansionary. However, on the same day, the
FOMC downgraded its forecast for the US economy in 2013 2.5-3.0% year-on-year
to 2.3-3.0%. “Stock prices jumped after the Fed released its policy statement
at midday, then began falling during Mr Bernanke’s news conference about two
hours later as he insisted the Fed was not significantly increasing its efforts to
bolster the economy.” Source: www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-12-12/
the-fed-turns-aggressively-dovish-with-evans-rule and www.nytimes.
com/2012/12/13/business/economy/fed-to-maintain-stimulus-bond-buying.
html?mcubz=1.
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B.2 Event Significance
To assess the significance of daily changes in actual yields yld, OIS rates iois, fitted yields ŷld,
risk-neutral yields êxp and term premia t̂p at the 2, 5 and 10-year maturities on specific event
days (considered in tables 4-7), I estimate regressions of the following form:
∆xn,t = αx,n +Eventtβx,n +Dtγx,n + εx,n,t (5)
where x =
{
yld, iois, ŷld, êxp, t̂p
}
and n = {2, 5, 10}. Eventt is a 1 × 16 vector of 16 dummy
variables each pertaining to a specific unconventional monetary policy announcement date listed
in table 3. The dummies are set equal to 1 on the announcement date they are linked with,
and 0 otherwise. βx,n is a 16 × 1 vector of parameters to be estimated. The control variables
are included in Dt, a 1 ×K vector of K dummy variables pertaining to other macroeconomic
data releases, set equal to 1 on release dates and 0 otherwise, where K is the number of
different types of macroeconomic data releases (12). γx,n is a K × 1 vector of parameters
to be estimated. The twelve macroeconomic data releases, from the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis and Bureau of Labour Statistics, included are: Advanced US GDP; Preliminary US
GDP; Final US GDP; International Trade; US Personal Income and Outlays; US International
Transactions; US Employment Situation; US Job Openings and Labour Turnover; US Producer
Price Index; US Consumer Price Index; Preliminary US Productivity and Costs; and Revised
US Productivity and Costs.
The i-th element of βx,n represents the difference between the change in x on unconventional
monetary policy announcement day i, where i = 1, 2, ..., 16, and the average daily change in
x on other dates, excluding other unconventional monetary policy announcements and other
US macroeconomic data releases. If the i-th element of β̂x,n is statistically significant, then
unconventional policy announcement i is said to have a significant effect on x at the n-year
horizon. The additional macroeconomic data release dummies Dt are included to ensure that
the significance of daily changes in x are compared to dates with no significant news pertaining
to the US economy. This empirical specification underpins the significance levels associated
with daily changes in variables in tables 4-7.
Table 10 presents the significance of all 16 event dates together. To assess the significance
of daily changes in fitted yields ŷld, risk-neutral yields êxp and term premia t̂p at the 2, 5 and
10-year maturities on all event days, I estimate regressions of the following form:
∆xn,t = αx,n + βx,neventt +Dtγx,n + εx,n,t (6)
eventt is a dummy variable equal to 1 on the LSAP and forward guidance event dates in table
3, and 0 otherwise. βx,n is a scalar to be estimated.
βx,n represents the difference between average daily changes in x on unconventional mon-
etary policy announcement days and on other dates that exclude other US macroeconomic
data releases. If β̂x,n is statistically significant, then the 16 unconventional monetary policy
announcements are said to have a cumulative significant effect on x at the n-year horizon.
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Table 10: Significance of Daily Changes in US Treasury Yields and Their Sub-Components
from Equation (6)
Model β̂yld,n β̂exp,n β̂tp,n
2-Year Maturity
Bias-Corrected −5.06*** −2.85*** −2.21
Survey-Augmented −4.53*** −0.84* −3.70**
OIS-Augmented −4.65*** −4.36*** −0.29***
5-Year Maturity
Bias-Corrected −7.73** −3.17** −4.56
Survey-Augmented −7.86** −2.29*** −5.57**
OIS-Augmented −6.96*** −6.26*** −0.70*
10-Year Maturity
Bias-Corrected −8.00* −2.75 −5.26
Survey-Augmented −9.28** −2.69*** −6.59**
OIS-Augmented −6.51** −4.84*** −1.67
Note: Estimates of βx,n from (6) using daily frequency changes in fitted yields, risk-neutral yields
and term premia from the bias-corrected, survey-augmented and OIS-augmented GADTSMs using
data from January 2, 2008 to April 31, 2013. Estimates that are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * respectively. Significance is determined
by t-statistics calculated using Newey and West (1987) standard errors. All figures are reported in
basis points to two decimal places.
Table 10 presents the results of estimation of (6). The results indicate that the daily changes
of fitted yields from all three models at all three maturities on unconventional monetary policy
announcement days were significantly different to their daily change on other dates, excluding
other macroeconomic data release dates. Moreover, changes in interest rate expectations from
the OIS-augmented decomposition were also significantly different on unconventional monetary
policy announcement dates at all horizons.
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C Signalling, Portfolio Rebalancing and the Real Economy:
Additional Results
C.1 Robustness of Results for Model 1: 5 Variable SVAR
In this appendix, I show that the findings in section 5.3.1 are robust to: (i) sample length; (ii)
interest rate maturity considered; and (iii) term structure decomposition (including the use of
the 2-year OIS rate, instead of the 2-year risk-neutral yield, alongside the term premium).
(i) Sample Length Figures 9 and 10 depict the impulse response functions for signalling and
portfolio rebalancing shocks from model 1, estimated using the 10-year OIS-augmented yield
decomposition between November 2008 and December 2015 — the entire ELB period. The
primary result of this paper is unaffected by the sample period extension: the signalling shock
has significantly positive lagged effects on industrial production, while the responses of the same
variables to the portfolio rebalancing shock is insignificantly different from zero at all horizons.
Figure 9 demonstrates that effects of the signalling shock. The responses of industrial
production are significantly positive 9 to 31 months after the shock under scheme 1, and 9 to
36 months after the shock under scheme 2. The peak increase in industrial production with the
longer sample is slightly larger than in section 5.3.1. Here, the industrial production response
peaks at 0.28% and 0.38% after 15 months under schemes 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, the
impulse response of CPI is significantly positive 4 to 31 months after the shock, peaking at
0.20% after 14 months, with scheme 1. Under scheme 2, the response peaks at 0.26% after 15
months, and is statistically significant from 5 to 36 months after the shock.
In contrast, figure 10 presents the impulse responses of variables in model 1 to the portfolio
rebalancing shock. The industrial production and CPI responses are insignificantly different
from zero at all horizons, as in section 5.3.1. Similarly, the (insignificant) peak increases are
smaller than their corresponding peak increases in response to the signalling shock.
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 1 using Sign Restriction
Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 10-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to December 2015. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 1 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent a 10
basis point fall in the 10-year term premium, estimated using the 4-OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to December 2015. The two sign restriction schemes are
detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the
5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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(ii) Interest Rate Maturity Figures 11 and 12 present the impulse response functions for the
signalling and portfolio rebalancing shocks from model 1, estimated using the OIS-augmented
decomposition of the 5-year Treasury yield. They illustrate that the headline results of section
5.3.1 are broadly robust to the alteration of yield maturity.
In figure 11, industrial production and CPI respond significantly positively to the pure
expectations shock, identified with scheme 2. The response of industrial production peaks at
0.25% after 9 months, and is significant 6 to 25 months after the shock. The CPI response is
significant 3 to 32 months after the shock, and peaks at 0.18% 5 months after the shock.
Figure 11: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 1 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 5-Year Treasury
Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 5-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a). The
VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes are detailed
in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the 5% and
95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block bootstrap.
Under scheme 1, the CPI response to the signalling shock is also significantly positive 3 to 8
months after the shock. The industrial production response peaks at 0.12% in the ninth month
after the shock. Although the impulse response of industrial production is not significantly
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positive at any horizon using a 5-95% confidence interval, the peak response is significant using
a 10-90% interval.
Figure 12 documents that the impulse responses of industrial production and CPI from
model 1, using the 5-year Treasury yield, are insignificantly different from zero, as in section
5.3.1. Thus, the results support the primary conclusion of the paper: as a result of reductions
in longer-term interest rates between November 2008 and April 2013, the greatest benefits for
industrial production were attributable to the signalling channel.
Figure 12: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 1 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 5-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent
a 10 basis point fall in the 5-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd,
2017a). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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(iii.a) Term Structure Decomposition: Survey-Augmented The primary conclusion
of the paper is also robust to the yield curve decomposition used in the SVAR. Even with the
survey-augmented Kim and Wright (2005) decomposition of Treasury yields, which places a
lower relative weight on the signalling channel in the event study (section 4.2), I find that the
signalling channel had greater expansionary effects on industrial production.
Figure 13: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 1 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the Survey-Augmented Decomposition of the 2-Year Treasury
Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 2-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the survey-augmented decomposition (Kim and Wright,
2005). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
Figures 13 and 14 present the impulse response functions for the signalling and portfolio
rebalancing shocks from model 1, estimated using the survey-augmented decomposition of the
2-year Treasury yield. Recall that in section 5.3.1, the survey-augmented model attributed
the lowest relative weight to signalling at the 2-year horizon, of the three horizons considered.
Therefore, in light of the event study results, this robustness exercise poses the greatest challenge
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for the paper’s headline conclusion.
Figure 13 demonstrates that, even with the 2-year survey-augmented decomposition, an
expansionary signalling shock has a significant positive effect on industrial production and CPI.
In fact, the peak expansionary effect (1.0% after 8 months under schemes 1 and 2) is over
double that estimated with the OIS-augmented model, and is significant from the fifth month
after the shock onwards under both identification schemes. The same is true for CPI, which is
significantly positive from the second month after the shock onwards. Notwithstanding these
differences, the quantitative results from this VAR should be given less credence in light of the
identification problem underlying the survey-augmented decomposition series.
Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 1 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the Survey-Augmented Decomposition of the 2-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent a
10 basis point fall in the 2-year term premium, estimated using the survey-augmented decomposition (Kim and
Wright, 2005). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction
schemes are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines
represent the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-
based block bootstrap.
In contrast, figure 14 indicates that an expansionary portfolio balance shock has statistically
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insignificant effects on industrial production and CPI at all horizons, except for the response
of CPI three to four months after the shock under scheme 2. The peak industrial production
and CPI responses to the portfolio rebalancing shock are considerably smaller than their peak
responses to the signalling shock.
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(iii.b) Using OIS Rates to Measure Interest Rate Expectations In this section, I
demonstrate that the SVAR results are also robust to using the 2-year OIS rate, instead of the
2-year risk-neutral yield, alongside the 2-year term premium in the VAR. This robustness check
accounts for the possibility that, because both the risk-neutral yield and the term premium are
estimated within the same GADTSM, they do not vary independently. This robustness exercise
is only valid at the 2-year horizon, as longer-horizon OIS rates include statistically significant
term premia (Lloyd, 2017b).
Figure 15: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 1 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2, the 2-Year OIS Rate and the 2-Year Term Premium from the
OIS-Augmented Model
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 2-year OIS rate. The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two
sign restriction schemes are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin
dashed lines represent the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using
a residual-based block bootstrap.
Figures 15 and 16 present the impulse responses to the signalling and portfolio rebalancing
shocks, respectively. Figure 15 demonstrates that the pure expectations shock, from scheme
2, has a significantly positive lagged impact on industrial production and CPI. Here, the in-
dustrial production response is significant from the twelfth month after the shock and peaks at
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0.19% after 13 months. CPI’s response is significant from the third month onwards, peaking
at 0.15% after 4 months. Under scheme 1, the responses of industrial production and CPI
are only significantly positive using a 16-84% confidence interval. Nevertheless, the median
responses of industrial production and CPI to the signalling shock exceed their responses to
the portfolio rebalancing shock (figure 16) at all horizons. In fact, under scheme 1, the expan-
sionary portfolio rebalancing shock has a significantly negative impact on industrial production
and CPI. Although the responses of industrial production and CPI under scheme 2, which are
quantitatively preferable as they allow the OIS rate to react contemporaneously to the portfolio
rebalancing shock, are insignificantly different from zero at all horizons, except for the response
of industrial production in the sixth month after the shock which is briefly significantly negative.
Figure 16: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 1 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2, the 2-Year OIS Rate and the 2-Year Term Premium from the
OIS-Augmented Model
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Months
-100
-50
0
50
100
b
.p
.
2-Year OIS Rate
Sch. 1: Pure T.P.
Sch. 2
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Months
-10
-5
0
5
b
.p
.
2-Year Term Premium (OIS)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Months
-6
-4
-2
0
2
P
er
ce
n
t
Industrial Production
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Months
-3
-2
-1
0
1
P
er
ce
n
t
Consumer Price Index
Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent
a 10 basis point fall in the 2-year term premium from the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a). The
VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes are detailed
in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the 5% and
95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block bootstrap.
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C.2 Models 2 and 3: Adding Controls
In this appendix, I provide evidence showing that the findings from models 2 and 3 in section
5.4 are robust to: (i) the sample length; (ii) the interest rate maturity considered; and (iii) the
term structure decomposition used.
(i) Sample Length As for model 1, the results for model 2 are robust to the extension of
sample period to November 2008 to December 2015 — the entire ELB period.
The impulse response functions for the signalling and portfolio rebalancing shocks from
model 2, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition of the 10-year yield are presented
in figures 17 and 18.
Figure 17: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 2 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year Treasury
Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 10-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to December 2015. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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Figure 17 demonstrates that the expansionary signalling shock has significantly positive
effects on industrial production and CPI under both restriction schemes. The impulse responses
of industrial production are significantly positive for 10 to 29 months after the shock under
scheme 1, and 10 to 32 months after the shock with scheme 2. The CPI response is significant
for 3 to 34 months after the shock under scheme 1, and 5 to 35 months after the shock with
scheme 2. The response of bank credit is significantly positive after 26 months under scheme 1
and 38 months with scheme 2.
Figure 18 shows that, with the longer sample, the portfolio rebalancing shock still has no
significant impact on industrial production and CPI at any horizon, with the exception of
CPI under scheme 2 in the second month after the shock. The response of bank credit is
insignificantly different from zero under both restriction schemes at all horizons.
Figure 18: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 2 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent a 10
basis point fall in the 10-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to December 2015. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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As for models 1 and 2, the results for model 3 are robust to the extension of sample period
to November 2008 to December 2015 — the entire ELB period.
The impulse response functions for the signalling and portfolio rebalancing shocks from
model 3, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition of the 10-year yield are presented
in figures 19 and 20.
Figure 19: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 3 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year Treasury
Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 10-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to December 2015. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
Figure 19 demonstrates that the expansionary signalling shock has significantly positive
effects on industrial production and CPI under both restriction schemes. Under scheme 2, the
real exchange rate depreciates significantly in the 9 months immediately after the shock. In
contrast, figure 20 shows that, with the longer sample, the portfolio rebalancing shock still has
no significant positive impact on industrial production and CPI at any horizon in model 3. The
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real exchange rate significantly depreciates on impact, as both restriction schemes require, but
the response thereafter is insignificantly different from zero.
Figure 20: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 3 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 10-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent a 10
basis point fall in the 10-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a).
The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to December 2015. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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(ii) Interest Rate Maturity The results from model 2 are robust to the use of the OIS-
augmented decomposition of the 5-year yield.
Figure 21 demonstrates that an expansionary signalling shock has significantly positive
lagged effects on industrial production and CPI when the OIS-augmented decomposition of
the 5-year yield is used in model 2 with scheme 2. Under scheme 1, the signalling shock has
significantly positive lagged effects on CPI, but the response of industrial production is only
significantly positive when 10% and 95% confidence intervals are used. Nevertheless, the shock
has significantly positive lagged effects on bank credit under both restriction schemes.
Figure 21: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 2 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 5-Year Treasury
Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 5-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd, 2017a). The
VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes are detailed
in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent the 5% and
95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block bootstrap.
Figure 22 shows that the industrial production, CPI and bank credit responses to a port-
folio rebalancing shock are not significantly different from zero at any horizon when the OIS-
augmented decomposition of the 5-year yield is included in model 2.
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Figure 22: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 2 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the OIS-Augmented Decomposition of the 5-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent
a 10 basis point fall in the 5-year term premium, estimated using the OIS-augmented decomposition (Lloyd,
2017a). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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(iii) Term Structure Decomposition: Survey Augmented Figures 23 and 24 depict
the impulse response functions to signalling and portfolio rebalancing shocks for model 2, esti-
mated between November 2008 and April 2013 using the survey-augmented decomposition of
the 2-year Treasury yield. Figure 23 demonstrates that an expansionary signalling shock has
significantly positive lagged effects on industrial production, CPI and bank credit under scheme
2. With scheme 1, the responses are insignificantly different from zero with 5% and 95% con-
fidence intervals. Figure 24 demonstrates that the responses of industrial production, CPI and
bank credit to an expansionary portfolio rebalancing shock are not significantly positive at any
horizon. Under scheme 1, the three variables fall significantly in response to the expansionary
pure ter premium shock.
Figure 23: Impulse Response Functions to a Signalling Shock for Model 2 using Sign
Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the Survey-Augmented Decomposition of the 2-Year Treasury
Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a signalling shock, normalised to represent a 10 basis
point fall in the 2-year risk-neutral yield, estimated using the survey-augmented decomposition (Kim and Wright,
2005). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction schemes
are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines represent
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-based block
bootstrap.
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Figure 24: Impulse Response Functions to a Portfolio Rebalancing Shock for Model 2 using
Sign Restriction Schemes 1 & 2 and the Survey-Augmented Decomposition of the 2-Year
Treasury Yield
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Note: The plots show the impulse response functions to a portfolio rebalancing shock, normalised to represent a
10 basis point fall in the 2-year term premium, estimated using the survey-augmented decomposition (Kim and
Wright, 2005). The VAR is estimated using data from November 2008 to April 2013. The two sign restriction
schemes are detailed in table 8. The bold lines denote median impulse response draws. The thin dashed lines
represent the 5% and 95% confidence intervals around median impulse responses, constructed using a residual-
based block bootstrap.
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